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Abstract: The article provides a survey of the growing experimental literature on the 
investigation of corruption and extends previous surveys. We discuss three aspects which 
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1. Introduction 
Economists and other social scientists have shown a long and ongoing research 
interest in corruption (cf. Rose-Ackerman 2006). For instance, they investigate the relation 
between governance structure (Kaufmann et al. 2007, Shah 2006), hierarchy (Mishra 2006), 
political decentralization (Fan et al. 2009), culture (Lipset and Lenz 2000), or individual 
characteristics (Mocan 2008; Olken 2009) and the emergence of corruption. They analyze 
different forms of corruption, such as bribery, embezzlement in private and public 
organizations, and rent-seeking behaviour in general. Many studies in economics and other 
social sciences are motivated by an interest in the effects of corrupt activities on efficiency 
and development, hence the effects on the well-being of groups. 
In the economic analysis of corrupt behaviour institutions play a central role (see Serra 
2006 for a test of variables related to corruption). Corruption itself is an institution in the 
sense that it can constitute a behavioural norm for members of a group. If individuals 
implement these norms into their decisions, then the outcome may be an inefficient 
equilibrium. Moreover, corruption is an institution because it is an allocation mechanism 
which occurs in addition to, or replaces, other existing allocation mechanisms, such as 
markets or hierarchies. Consequently, an understanding of individual behaviour with respect 
to corruption requires consideration of institutions. 
Economic theory allows predicting decisions of rational individuals in given settings. 
Individuals rely on the ‘institution of corruption’ if the expected gains from corruption are 
higher than the expected gains when using alternative institutions. In this sense, individuals 
substitute or complement different institutions by employing corruption in order to achieve 
individual aims. Since expected gains also depend on expected costs, corrupt behaviour may 
rise since the expected costs of using the institution of corruption are lower with respect to 
achieving the individual aims compared to those of alternative institutions. 
Within the New Institutional Economics framework ‘corrupt behaviour’ is often 
defined as rational behaviour in a principal-agent model (cf. Lambsdorff 2002). If agents are 
corrupt, under given constraints they optimize and misuse their power for a private benefit 
(Lambsdorff 2007, 16). Thus negative externalities for third parties can occur. Corruption is 
in many contexts regarded as a form of criminal activity. If economists follow this 
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perspective, it is because corruption may lead to inefficiencies and consequently to a loss of 
social welfare. 
A milestone in the economic literature on behaviour and crime is Becker’s paper 
(1968). Becker applies rational choice theory to criminal activities and outlines the influence 
of fines on such behaviour. Becker’s ideas have been applied to corruption of law enforcers 
such as the police (Becker and Stigler 1974). If the aim is to reduce corruption, then different 
incentive mechanisms which influence opportunity costs become important. One proposed 
solution is to increase salaries of law enforcers in order to increase the quality of their work 
and to make them less vulnerable to attempts of bribery and, with this to increase the 
opportunity costs of losing their job. A second solution is to implement competition among 
law enforcers and to allow private law-enforcing agents to operate beside state agents. 
Another approach is to implement a controlling agent (e.g., an anti-corruption unit) who 
monitors the law enforcement agency. If an anti-corruption unit is permitted to collect fines 
from corrupt law enforcement agents (cf. Mookherjee and Png 1995; recently Silva et al. 
2007), this may reduce corrupt behaviour (cf. for casual corruption also Bowles and Garoupa 
1997; Chang et al. 2000). In short, the institutional structure in which corruption is embedded 
influences the emergence and the level of corrupt behaviour (cf. e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
1993). 
However, additionally to theoretical studies it is necessary to consider empirical 
microeconomic studies because their results provide a further analysis of the mechanisms 
underlying corruption. Moreover, empirical research allows testing variables that influence 
corrupt behaviour and may thus give advice for political measures aiming to reduce 
corruption in a society. Among other methods, economic experiments are one possibility for 
empirical investigation (cf. Dušek et al. 2005; Abbink 2006). Economic experiments can be 
considered a complementary method to those methods employed in related social sciences in 
order to investigate corruption, such as questionnaire surveys in Sociology or participant 
observation and case studies in Anthropology and Criminology: Experiments allow controlled 
tests on the influence of specific variables on corrupt decisions. Thus experiments are 
empirical tests of the formulated theories and, furthermore, results from experiments may 
allow formulating policy measures to fight corruption. 
Testing corruption empirically through economic experiments is, however, a rather 
new field. Several years ago Renner (2004), Andvig (2005), Dušek et al. (2005), and Abbink 
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(2006) published first surveys on the topic. A more recent survey of Frank et al. (2011) 
focuses on the aspect of gender and corruption in economic experiments and Li (2012, 22-54) 
analyzes the influence of culture. In this paper we summarize and expand the surveys by 
showing recent trends in this emerging literature and outlining three aspects, which we regard 
as ones that should deserve a more thorough investigation in future research. First, we argue 
that individual’s values and perceptions in experiments should be considered more carefully. 
Second, a broader perspective is needed to investigate the influence of groups and group 
norms, such as networks, on corrupt behaviour. While research on group behaviour and 
effects of individual behaviour on group members is a standard topic in experimental 
economics, the transfer to the research on corruption has not been exploited yet. Third, we 
emphasize that economic corruption experiments need to be embedded in broader social 
science research on corruption. These three aspects are outlined in the third section of the 
paper after the survey of the recent experimental literature in the next section.
1
 
 
2. Corruption Investigated in the Lab 
In the surveys of corruption experiments by Andvig (2005), and particularly by Dušek 
et al. (2005) and Abbink (2006), several economic experiments on corruption are discussed in 
detail.
2
 That is why we keep comparatively short the discussion of those papers that are 
already discussed and concentrate on newly emerging strands in this literature. 
Two experiments on factors that influence corruptibility of individuals are conducted 
by Frank and Schulze (2000) and Schulze and Frank (2003). Frank and Schulze (2000) carry 
out the first economic corruption experiment ever recorded. They implement two different 
treatments: in a controlled environment without any risk of detection, individuals have first to 
decide in a situation with a trade-off between maximizing individual profit and maximizing 
                                                          
1
 Since some studies have been reviewed while being working papers, the years of publication of the 
studies mentioned here may differ from those in previous surveys. The literature has been developing 
very fast and only in 2011 a large number of working papers emerged. We are aware that this survey 
cannot capture all available papers. We have tried to cover all papers published by mid 2011. 
2
 For instance, the papers of Frank and Schulze (2000) and Schulze and Frank (2003) are reviewed in 
Andvig (2005, 255), Dušek et al. (2005, 152-153), Abbink (2006, 420-422), and Frank et al. (2011). 
The same applies for the papers of Abbink (2002) and Abbink et al. (2002) which are elaborated on in 
Andvig (2005, 265), Dušek et al. (2005, 150-152), or Abbink (2006, 422-424), and the paper of Azfar 
and Nelson (2007) is reviewed in Andvig (2005, 266), Dušek et al. (2005, 154-155), and Abbink 
(2006, 429-431). Frank et al. (2011) summarizes, for instance, Rivas (2008), Alatas et al. (2009a), 
Armantier and Boly (2008), and Abbink (2006, 434-435) summarizes Büchner et al. (2008). 
Nevertheless, several other published papers have not been considered in previous reviews. 
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the gains of the public interest. In the second treatment, in addition to individual pay-off from 
the experiment, participants receive an additional lump-sum payment in order to examine 
whether corruption would decrease if individuals are rewarded for their ‘job’ during the 
experiment. Frank and Schulze (2000) find out that, apparently due to self-selection, 
economics students tend more to corruptibility than other groups of students, and that lump-
sum payments do not affect the outcome. In their second experiment, Schulze and Frank 
(2003) test the impact that a detection mechanism has on the propensity for corrupt behaviour. 
In an experiment with a similar setting like the experiment of Frank and Schulze (2000), they 
introduce a detection likelihood that positively depends on the amount of the bribe 
proposition. If a corrupt individual is detected, she does not receive a positive pay-off. The 
aim is to investigate whether the possibility of detection lowers corruption or strengthens it 
due to the increased costs of corruption. In this experiment, only one player receives her pay-
off in the end. Schulze and Frank’s findings indicate that a detection mechanism significantly 
increases the amount of people deciding for a corrupt action, thus it abates the intrinsic 
motivation for honesty. However, in their experimental setting there were fewer people under 
monitoring who engage in corruption.
3
 
One of the main objectives of experiments on corruption is the investigation of a 
bribing situation. In many cases experiments are designed in such a way that a public official 
takes a bribe from an individual in exchange for a favour (Abbink 2006, 422). These 
experiments address reciprocity and are often investigated in the form of a modified trust-
game. Abbink et al. (2002) are the first who design a bribery experiment with regards to the 
influence of punishment and negative external effects. Abbink et al. (2002) have a lasting 
effect on the literature and their experiment has been replicated and adopted in many ways. 
The original experiment consists of three treatments with the pairing of two players, one in 
the role of a firm and the other in the role of a public official. The firm decides if she wants to 
propose a bribe to the public official and has to pay a relatively low transfer fee. If the public 
official rejects the bribe, both players receive their initial endowment, less the transfer fee. If 
the public official accepts, both payoffs increase significantly. In the second stage of the 
game, the public official decides between two options: one option significantly increases the 
pay-off of the firm but has a lower pay-off for the public official. The other option is better 
                                                          
3
 Olken (2007) reports about a field experiment in Indonesia. He finds that an increase in audits of 
road projects in villages have a positive effect on reduced missing expenditures and concludes “… that 
traditional top-down monitoring can play an important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly 
corrupt environment.” (2007, 201). 
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for the public official but has a negative effect on the pay-off of other players. The major 
findings of this investigation are that the introduction of a negative external effect in the form 
of a reduced payoff of other players does not seem to significantly affect the amount and 
frequency of bribing. On the other hand, after the introduction of a punishment mechanism 
the average bribing amount as well as the frequency in the choice of the option, which is 
better for the public official, significantly declines. In follow-up studies, Abbink (2002, 2004) 
investigates the effects of fair salaries and the impact of staff rotation on corruption in 
Germany. The experimental layout is built upon the experimental design of Abbink et al. 
(2002). Results of the first game with staff rotation (Abbink 2004) reveal a sharp decrease in 
the average bribe as well as in the frequency of the choice that favours the public official. In 
the second game with differences in salaries (Abbink 2002), no significant difference was 
captured between the high-wage and low-wage treatment, so the salary seems to have no 
influence on corruptibility in this case. Some of the studies which also use the set-up of 
Abbink et al. (2002) are discussed next.
4
 
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) run a corruption experiment that investigates the 
effect of in-context framed presentation of the experiment on the level of corruption compared 
to an abstract neutral terminology, as typically used in experimental economics (Abbink and 
Hennig-Schmidt 2006, 103-104). They address the question of external validity of corruption 
experiments, a problem also mentioned by Dušek et al. (2005). Since the term ‘corruption’ 
usually has a negative connotation, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt investigate whether a 
neutrally framed corruption experiment with abstract wording is capable of catching the real-
life reaction of participants adequately. Their experimental design is built on one of the 
treatments of the bribery trust-game introduced by Abbink et al. (2002), but with different 
instructions in one of the two treatments. They compare the results of the neutrally framed 
game with the same game with framed instructions in order to provoke a framing effect by 
suggestive phrasing. The task is presented as an interaction between a firm and a public 
official, where the firm can engage in private payments in order to receive a permission for an 
industrial plant and with this, harm the public. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) also 
implement a punishment mechanism in the form of an immediate exclusion from the 
experiment with the likelihood of 0.3%. In contrast to the hypothesis that framed instructions 
will provoke a negative attitude towards corruption and thus, lead to less corrupt behaviour, 
                                                          
4
 The working papers of Jacquemet (2005) and Castro (2006), both using the design of Abbink et al. 
(2002), are not discussed here, but see Abbink (2006, 427-428) for a discussion of Jacquemet. 
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there is no significant treatment effect through framing: neither the average bribe proposed by 
the firms, nor the frequency of permissions given by the public officials differs between the 
treatments. As Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt conclude, for this specific experiment, presenting 
this experiment with suggestive wording does not alter the findings. 
Rivas (2008), also following Abbink et al. (2002), investigates gender effects (cf. also 
the discussion of Rivas 2008 in Frank et al. 2011, 62-63). In the experiment four sessions are 
conducted in order to find out whether the behaviour of the participants depends on the 
gender of their opponents. In two of the sessions subjects of both genders participate: one 
gender in the role of the firm, and the other gender as the public official. In the other two 
sessions only subjects belonging to one gender participate in both roles. The result is that 
gender has no statistically significant effect on the probability of offering a bribe, although the 
bribe amount is lower if the briber is a woman. Women tend to accept bribes less frequently if 
the briber is a woman. After accepting a bribe, women in the role of public officials tend to 
engage in a reciprocal action less frequently than men. Rivas concludes that men are more 
corrupt than women and that a greater number of women in positions where corruption occurs 
could lower the level of corruption. 
Gonzáles et al. (2007) conduct a bribery experiment that is based on an ultimatum 
bargaining game (Gonzáles et al. are also discussed in Abbink 2006, 426-427). Gonzáles et al. 
investigate the effect of greasing a public official in order to reach a faster decision. The 
experiment is a one-shot game and uses a strategy elicitation method. In the experiment, a 
player in the role of a firm can portion an amount of money in three parts among herself and 
two other players in the role of two public officials. This reflects a situation in which a firm 
applies for a permit that has to be approved by two public officials. This permit will allow the 
firm to gain a certain surplus, which she can divide between her and the two public officials. 
Both public officials, independently of each other, have to accept this proposal in order for the 
payment to take place, thus, both public officials have veto power. Only one of the two public 
officials has the power to prolongate the decision, which is costly for the firm and also costly 
for herself. This public official has full information about the offer of the firm: she knows her 
proposed amount, the amount proposed to the second public official and the amount that the 
firm keeps for herself. The other public official, who has no power to delay the decision, has 
only the information of her own amount proposed by the firm. The effect of bribery is 
captured here through the additional amount which the firm proposes to the public official 
who has the power to prolongate the decision, not generally through the amount proposed to 
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the two officials. The findings are as follows: the public officials who have the power to delay 
their decision often demand a premium. The public official with delay power tends to use this 
power when the other public official receives a higher amount than herself. The amounts 
offered to the public officials by the firm are higher than one would expect according to 
traditional theory. The firm offers this ‘premium’ in order to avoid a delay, it thus engages in 
greasing. Proposals that implement an equal amount for each involved player lead to the 
highest acceptance rate. Both public officials reject very low offers, underlying the 
importance of social norms in strategic games. 
Bilotkach (2006) tests bribery in the context of tax evasion with a comparatively small 
number of subjects. In the experiment students are in the role of businesspeople who can 
avoid being taxed through bribing an official. The experiment resembles a conspiracy 
situation between tax payers and public officials and is adapted to the situation in Ukraine. 
Bilotkach finds that participants in the role of businesspeople offer bribes more aggressively 
if they know about the corruptability of participants in the role of public officials (2006, 31). 
However, offering bribes has no effect on the behaviour of the participants in the role of 
public officials. 
Armantier and Boly (2008) investigate the external validity of a laboratory experiment 
with students from Canada against a field survey in Burkina Faso (the paper is also briefly 
reviewed in Frank et al. 2011, 64). One subgroup of the players has to write a dictation, and 
their payoff is negatively correlated to the flaws they make in their writing. They have the 
option to bribe the other subgroup of players who correct the dictation and could overlook 
flaws in reward for a bribe. In the conducted experiment, each agent bribed her corrector. In 
four different treatments the authors investigate the variation effects of the payment amount, 
the amount of the bribe, and the monitoring and punishment for bribing. The findings of 
Armantier and Boly reveal that results of the laboratory experiment as compared to results of 
the field experiment show statistically insignificant differences. With respect to individual 
characteristics they find that religiosity and age seem to be negatively correlated to the 
acceptance of bribes. 
Another recent experiment investigates cultural differences. Cameron et al. (2009) 
conduct a corruption experiment in Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore in order to test 
the impact of culture and institutional framework within a country on individual decision 
making. While according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
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Australia and Singapore are among the least corrupt countries in the world, the opposite 
counts for Indonesia and India. Cameron et al. test whether a corrupt environment, on the one 
hand, promotes corruption since it lowers the inhibition threshold and, on the other hand, 
generates tolerance and thus lowers the propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. In the 
experiment a player in the role of a firm can offer a bribe (for little costs) to a player in the 
role of a public official. The public official can accept or reject this proposition. If the public 
official accepts the bribe offer of the firm, then the payoff of a third player, the citizen, 
decreases, while the payoff of both the firm and the public official increases through bribing. 
The citizen can punish the other two players in the last stage of the game. If she decides to 
punish, she reduces her own income. Two different treatments are played: one is welfare-
reducing, the other is welfare-enhancing in the case of corrupt decisions. In the welfare-
enhancing treatment the sum of the payoffs of all players is higher if bribing occurs because 
the losses of the third player are lower than the combined gains of the other two players. In 
line with theoretical predictions, in most of the games a bribe is offered and the public 
officials also accept the bribe in most of the cases. However, approximately half of the 
citizens whose payoff decreases through bribing, decide to make use of their punishment 
opportunity. Cameron et al. find a significant cross-country difference in the participants’ 
behaviour: Indians, as compared to Australians, being confronted with corruption, have a 
lower punishment frequency, while their propensity to engage in corruption is higher. 
Contrary to these findings, participants from Indonesia who are confronted with a high level 
of corruption in their country, have little tolerance for corruption. As for Singapore with a low 
level of corruption, the participants from this country are highly inclined to engage in 
corruption, and also disinclined to punish corruption. Cameron et al. argue that a more 
detailed institutional and historical framework of corruption in the countries has a 
considerable impact on individual behaviour, and due to that, the CPI is not able to capture all 
relevant factors in order to explain the variation of behaviour across the four countries. This 
emphasizes the impact of institutions like laws and group norms on individual behaviour with 
regards to corruption, which we discuss in the third section. 
Alatas et al. (2009b) conduct another field experiment with regard to subject pool 
effects. Participants are on the one hand Indonesian students and on the other hand Indonesian 
public servants. As corruption in Indonesia is comparatively high, they expect public officials 
to be more exposed to and, thus, more experienced with corruption than Indonesian students 
(this hypothesis was also confirmed through a post-experimental questionnaire about 
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corruption contact at work, but not outside the working place). The corruption experiment is 
built on the experimental design of Cameron et al. (2009), but does not explore cross-country 
differences of student behaviour but the inner-country differences among different subject 
pools instead. In contrast to most other corruption experiments, Alatas et al. (2009b) frame 
their experiment in the form of loaded instructions and use the terms ‘bribe’ and ‘punishment’ 
(Alatas et al. 2009b, 117). In this way, they first test for an experience effect with corruption. 
Second, they test for a selection effect whether people with a specific attitude towards 
corruption are inclined to become public officials. The game is a one-shot game and three 
participants are included in a single round: one has the role of a firm who can bribe the public 
official in order to boost her payoff; the other participant is a public official who can accept or 
deny the proposal of the firm; the third player has the role of a citizen who is harmed by a 
bribing action between the two former participants. This citizen can punish the other two 
players by decreasing their income after bribing has taken place. Through punishment she 
diminishes her own payoff as well. Engaging in or abstaining from punishment also shows 
her tolerance level for corruption. Results show that students in the role of a firm are more 
likely to engage in bribing than public servants in the role of the firm. Furthermore, students 
in the role of a public official are also more likely to accept a bribe than public servants in the 
same role. No significant difference in tolerance for corruption through punishment frequency 
is captured between the two subject pools. No self-selection effect is found in the experiment: 
the behaviour of students who indicate that they plan to become a public servant, is not 
statistically different from the behaviour of the other students, but is statistically different 
from the behaviour of public servants. Alatas et al. (2009b: 125) conclude that this underlines 
the impact of real-life work experience on behaviour. The experience effect expresses itself in 
the low tolerance for corruption of participants who are often confronted with corruption at 
work. 
A new strand of experiments has been developed by Barr and Serra (2009) who 
employ a modified one-shot ultimatum game, and analyze the impact of framing and 
variations of external costs. They find that bribe acceptance is comparatively low if negative 
externalities are comparatively high, hence individuals tend to abstain from corrupt behaviour 
if the external costs are heightened. However, the effect may be due to inequity aversion of 
players.  A different framing does not lead to a significant difference in bribe acceptance in 
their experiment. Based on the experimental design of Barr and Serra (2009), Barr and Serra 
(2010) conduct two corruption experiments (in 2005 and 2007) in order to test the cultural 
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impact on the propensity for corruption. The first experiment in 2005 is conducted with a 
group of 195 students from Oxford. One third of them are British, the other participants come 
from 33 different countries which Transparency International rates differently regarding 
corruption. The experimental design is as follows: 15 participants play in five groups of three 
players each. One participant in the role of a citizen proposes a bribe to a participant in the 
role of an official. If the player in the role of the official accepts (this is captured through the 
strategy elicitation method), the payoff of both players increases. Simultaneously, the payoff 
of the third players in the role of a member of the society in each of the five groups 
diminishes (Barr and Serra 2010: 864). Barr and Serra’s findings indicate that undergraduate 
students coming from countries with a comparatively high corruption index are also more 
inclined to engage in a ‘corrupt’ action in this experiment. However, these results do not hold 
for graduate students. Barr and Serra comment that the time spent in the immigration country 
and the selection process of the different immigration procedures may have distorted their 
subject pool and, thus, lead to different results for undergraduates and graduates. In 2007 Barr 
and Serra conduct another slightly different experiment (Barr and Serra 2010) in which they 
try to reduce the inaccuracy of their explaining variables. Here, the official indicates her 
bribing request, and the citizen indicates whether she accepts to pay the amount (the 
behaviour of the citizen is captured through strategy elicitation). This approach is reverse to 
the experiment in 2005, but all the other parameters of the 2005 game remain unchanged. 
Again, one third of the students are from Britain, and the other participants come from 21 
different countries. In this experiment, as in 2005, undergraduates coming from a country 
with a comparatively higher rate of corruption (according to Transparency International) show 
also a higher propensity to engage in corruption than undergraduates coming from countries 
with a comparatively lower rate of corruption. Again, this result does not hold for graduates. 
A deeper analysis of the impact of the time spent in the immigration country reveals that the 
propensity to engage in corruption decreases over time spent in Britain. However, this cannot 
explain the variations between undergraduate and graduate behaviour. Barr and Serra try to 
capture a selection effect of students coming to Britain by asking these students whether they 
are financed by a fellowship or their families. The hypothesis is that families who are 
financing their children’s education from their home country are richer, and thus, more 
corrupt, which may have an impact on the student behaviour. Barr and Serra find no 
confirmation of this hypothesis. They conclude that cultural socialization and norms can 
influence corruption. 
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In another recent study Serra (2011) tests the effectiveness of different monitoring 
mechanisms. One monitoring approach is top-down monitoring. The intervention against 
corrupt behaviour is conducted by the state, i.e. one public official controls another public 
official. An alternative monitoring approach is bottom-up monitoring where auditing is 
performed by citizens who are affected by corrupt relationships and, thus, have more 
information. The experiment of Serra (2011) is a one-shot game and builds on Barr and Serra 
(2009). It is conducted with 15 participants per round with 5 participants in each role. A 
player in the role of a citizen requires a service from the official. A player in the role of an 
official can demand a bribe from the citizen for a higher quality or for a faster processing of 
the service. If the citizen accepts to pay the bribe demanded by the public official, both 
players are better off. But if bribing is successful, then the payoff of the five other players in 
the role of the society diminishes. Serra (2011) investigates the propensity to demand bribes 
in three different treatments: first, a treatment without any form of monitoring, where the 
highest bribing frequency occurs; second, a treatment with top-down monitoring where the 
punishment likelihood for bribing is given as a percentage; third, a treatment with a combined 
mechanism, i.e. a bottom-up mechanism that enables top-down monitoring only after a 
complaint from a citizen. After a public official has demanded a bribe from a citizen, the 
citizen has the opportunity to report the public official without facing punishment costs 
herself. Only in cases where the public official is reported, she has to expect punishment with 
the same probability as in the second treatment. Otherwise the punishment probability is zero. 
Thus, the likelihood of being punished for a corrupt action in the third treatment is lower than 
in the second treatment with only top-down auditing. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, 
in this third treatment the bribing frequency is lower than in the second treatment although 
bribing in this third treatment is more rewarding for public officials. Surprisingly, the third 
treatment with the combined auditing mechanism and the lower probability of detection is the 
most effective mechanism to reduce corruption. Serra (2011:17) concludes that this result 
may have been obtained due to an aversion to betrayal by violating a subjective norm, and the 
non-monetary costs of a social disapproval in the form of being formally reported by a citizen. 
Serra also considers a behavioural bias, the conjunction fallacy in probability judgments, as 
an explanation for the experimental deviation from the theoretical prediction. 
Drugov et al. (2011) investigate the role of agents as intermediaries in a corruption 
framework. Intermediaries facilitate the relationship between a briber and a bribee by 
lowering information costs, for instance the costs of whom to bribe and also negotiation costs 
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of an agreement upon a bribing amount. An intermediary could also reduce the risk of being 
detected and punished and also lower the risk of a promise breach, as the intermediary is able 
to build up a long-term relationship to the bribee, which may be impossible for a briber 
(Drugov 2011, 3-4). Drugov et al. test whether intermediaries that facilitate the relationship 
between a briber and a bribee enhance the level of corruption: They expect that intermediaries 
may have the effect to abate the moral costs of a corrupt action, thus corrupt activities may 
increase (Drugov et al. 2011, 7). They use the experimental structure of Barr and Serra 
(2009). A player in the role of a citizen decides whether to bribe a public official in order to 
receive a certain service. The player in the role of a public official can accept or reject this 
proposition. If she accepts, her payoff and the payoff of the citizen increase, while the payoff 
of the third player diminishes. Drugov et al. conduct three treatments. In the first one, no 
intermediaries are involved. Here, citizens have no information about the bribing amount the 
public officials are likely to accept. In the second treatment, intermediaries are introduced as a 
fourth player. They communicate the minimum amount the public official would accept as a 
bribe to the citizens, who now have to decide whether to pay or not to pay this amount. In the 
third treatment, no intermediary is present, but the citizens are informed about the minimum 
bribing amount the public official is willing to accept. Findings suggest that intermediaries 
increase the share of corrupt public officials and the share of citizens who engage in 
corruption. In the presence of intermediaries, the moral costs of a corrupt action seem to 
diminish for the briber and bribee, as the average bribing amount demanded is lower and is 
paid more frequently by citizens. 
Barr et al. (2009) use an experimental design previously introduced by Azfar and 
Nelson (2007). In the experiment of Barr et al. (2009) a typical principal-agent relation is 
constructed in which the agent provides a service to a third party. Information asymmetries 
exist and the principal engages a monitor who controls the agents but can behave 
opportunistically. The set-up resembles a situation in public service sectors with the principal 
being the government which employs civil servants to provide services for third parties: the 
service recipients. Barr et al. (2009) conduct the experiment with employees in the Ethiopian 
health sector. They find out (2009, 237) that if the service recipients elect the agents ex ante, 
they then provide better services. If monitors are elected, these show higher efforts in their 
monitoring activity. The positive effects of electing monitors have previously been analyzed 
by Azfar and Nelson (2007) as well. They also reveal that increasing wages reduce corrupt 
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behavior and that reducing the options to conceal gains derived from corrupt decisions has the 
same effect. 
Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) test how the wording influences decisions in a 
corruption game. Proposers in an ultimatum game are in the role of a businessperson who can 
label her bribe as a ‘bribe’ or as a ‘gift’. Receivers play the role of public servants who can 
reciprocate, whistle-blow, or behave opportunistically. Results show that those 
businesspeople who prefer to call their bribe a ‘bribe’ are willing to punish opportunistic 
behavior of public servants harder than those businesspeople who label their bribe a ‘gift’. 
Their interpretation is that the term bribe is consciously chosen by proposers since the word 
indicates an expectation for reciprocity on the part of the civil servant (2010: 354). If the bribe 
is labeled as ‘gift’, the expectations of the bribe giver are signaled less clear. The wording 
itself becomes a signal for an individual’s expectation of other people’s behavior and thus, an 
enforcement mechanism of corruption. Schikora (2010, 2011) has investigated the effects of 
whistle-blowing on corruption more specifically. He finds that in a situation where both 
parties, a client and a public official, have the option to initiate corrupt behavior and where 
both have the option of whistle-blowing, then corruption increases rather than decreases (cf. 
also Lambsdorff and Frank 2010). A possible interpretation is that the option of whistle-
blowing stabilizes reciprocal behavior. 
In an early survey of Dušek et al. (2005: 155) another line of experiments is addressed. 
Dušek et al. refer to an experiment of Falk and Fischbacher (2002) in which participants have 
the option to maximize their own utility at the expense of others. The authors find out that 
“the average subjects steal the more, the more others steal.” (Falk and Fischbacher 2002, 
859). The neutrally framed experiment does not address corruption as such, however the 
results are relevant for situations in which corruption can occur. If social interaction effects 
within groups emerge, then corruption may be a self-enforcing institution within groups (cf. 
additionally Goette et al. 2006 for the effects of group membership on norm enforcement, and 
also Funk 2005; Dong et al. 2008 introduce the term ‘conditional corruption’). Thus, 
information about others’ behaviour may influence individual decisions whether to engage in 
corrupt behaviour or not. This line of experimental studies has not found much attention in 
experimental investigations on corruption yet. 
One recent exception is Schikora (2010, 36-76) who addresses in his study the 
relationship between corruption and cooperation. He conducts three experiments: First, he 
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tests the Four Eyes Principle in the Lab. Although this mechanism is often claimed to 
diminish corruption, Schikora finds that introducing this principle in an experiment has 
ambiguous effects and can increase corruption. Second, he analyzes the effect of a whistle-
blowing option on corruption. Whistle-blowing had two effects: It stabilized a corrupt 
relationship, and it serves as an insurance against exploitation by a public official. In his third 
experiment, Schikora analyzes the relationship between cooperation in a modified public 
good game and group composition. His findings of the differences in cooperation with regards 
to different groups stress the importance of within-group dynamics for the behaviour of 
individuals. 
 
3. Outlook 
 
In this concluding section we discuss aspects that, according to our opinion, deserve 
more careful consideration in future experiments on corruption. We fully confirm Abbink’s 
(2006, 435) statement on corruption that “[g]iven the vastness of the phenomenon and the 
plethora of situations in which it occurs, a dozen papers can barely scratch the surfaces.” 
Nevertheless, the literature is growing rapidly and more corruption experiments have been 
recently conducted but have not been published yet. In 2006 Abbink provided an outlook on 
three issues, which he thought to be important for further experimental research: the 
discussion on using neutral or loaded instructions, the influence of culture, and the link 
between field and laboratory research on corruption. To a certain degree the literature 
published over the last years has considered some of these issues, for instance, Barr and Serra 
(2009), Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) on framing effects, or Barr and Serra (2010) and Li 
(2012) on cultural differences. Our analysis refers to these issues but considers them in a 
broader context. Particularly, we suggest for the future a more careful consideration (1) of 
individual values in corruption experiments, (2) a broader perspective on the influence and 
emergence of norms within groups on corrupt behaviour, and (3) embedding corruption 
experiments in the much broader social science research on corruption. Next, we outline these 
issues and refer, where necessary, to further papers which point in the respective direction. 
(1) Individual values: The answer to the question which specific behaviour can or cannot be 
considered as corruption is complex. Laws label certain actions as corrupt in the sense that 
they are illegal. Implementing such an exogenous definition into an economic experiment 
unambiguously for all participants is challenging: Whether an individual perceives her actions 
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as corrupt may considerably differ from the law and strongly depend on the environment of 
the experiment. Furthermore, if an individual in an experiment chooses an action framed with 
the words ‘corrupt’, it does not necessarily mean that she considers herself corrupt after 
picking that move. In fact, no legal consequences follow, and any punishment mechanism in 
the form of social pressure after detection normally ends with the experiment. The only 
similarity to actual corruption consequences in an experiment is the participants’ associations 
with the wording. A participant could engage in a ‘corrupt’ action only due to utility 
maximizing or reciprocity without considering herself in violation of any norms or legal 
framework. Abbink (2006, 435-436; cf. also Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 2006) refers to the 
problem when he addresses the issue of wording experimental instructions, i.e. using loaded 
versus neutral wording. He emphasizes the specific, morally loaded context of corruption.  
We believe that the basic reason of the problem is the reference to an exogenously set 
definition, i.e. the definition of an experimenter who defines corrupt and non-corrupt 
behaviour in a specific experimental context. Specific terms may be, due to individually 
different moral values, of importance for some but not for other participants in a group of 
participants. If we assume that individual perceptions of corrupt behaviour are different 
within groups of participants in an experiment, then the same decisions may not be interpreted 
in the same way for all individuals. Decisions that have been considered as an indication for 
corruption, then, may in fact be interpreted rather differently. We know from empirical 
studies that a correlation between demographic variables, such as gender or age, and 
corruption exists (cf. Gatti et al. 2003; for gender Frank et al. 2011) and that tolerance levels 
of corruption differ between sub-groups of a population (see Alatas et al. 2009b for 
Indonesian students vs. Indonesian public servants). Hence, testing the impact of variables on 
corrupt behaviour requires additional knowledge on whether participants themselves consider 
their behaviour as corrupt. The subjective perception of and attitude towards corruption is 
important, if policy measures are derived from experiments to fight corruption. Nevertheless, 
most of the economic experiments on corruption have not systematically tested whether 
individuals violate their subjective values if they decide for a corrupt action. The only 
exception is, to the best of our knowledge, a working paper of Campos-Ortiz (2011) who 
reports on an experiment in this direction. He let participants report on their previous 
experience with bribery and on their individual attitude towards it. He finds out that those 
participants who have shown a propensity to corruption and a higher willingness to pay bribes 
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in the past show a stronger pro-bribery behavior in his experiment. This result is challenging 
for developing policy measures to fight corruption. 
 (2) Intra-group Norms: Some experiments address the relation between culture and 
corruption.
5
 One assumption of these studies is that moral values are different between 
members of different groups and that these can be measured with variables such as nationality 
(Cameron et al. 2009). The hypothesis reads that such differences in behaviour could be due 
to dissimilar social norms prevalent in different groups, hence cultures. Experimental results 
show (Cameron et al. 2009) that differences in behaviour can be related to cultural variables 
even if participants decide under the same legal framework (cf. Barr and Serra 2010). While 
culture is an important aspect to be investigated in more detail, we argue that it is insufficient 
to control for group characteristics, such as nationality, ethnicity or religion. Additionally, 
processes within groups need a more careful consideration. 
The experimental starting point could be Falk and Fischbacher’s (2002) results that 
social interaction effects are relevant, as already discussed in Dušek et al. (2005, 155). 
Economic experiments on corruption have not addressed the influence of group members on 
other members in detail yet. In many cases when corruption occurs, the principal–agent 
situation is rather complex because principles, agents and also monitors are members of 
specific or different social groups. Thus, group norms regarding corruption may emerge and 
influence individual decisions. If several subgroups within a society develop similar group 
norms regarding corruption, then whole societies may be caught in a corruption trap. Thus, an 
individual decision does not necessarily depend on her individual values but also on social 
norms that have emerged endogenously, i.e. within a group. We may ask which factors 
promote the evolution of a specific social norm within a group, for instance a behavioural 
norm of pro-corrupt behaviour that all individuals of a group follow. Certain factors influence 
such a norm, e.g. individual preferences of group members, group size, fluctuation of 
members, or entry and exit barriers to the group (cf. Abbink 2004, for the effect of staff 
rotation, also Schikora 2010, 36-76). The emergence of stable equilibria such as norms of pro-
corrupt behaviour is of particular interest for economic research because social norms which 
emerge endogenously in groups may constitute Nash equilibria. Thus, once a norm of pro-
corrupt behaviour has established, it becomes a stable equilibrium. Hence, negative 
                                                          
5
 In the experimental context the term ‘culture’ is often applied to participants with different 
nationality, ethnicity, religion, etc. It is documented, for instance, in the Corruption Perception Index 
by Transparency International (2010) that perceptions of corruptions are different between countries. 
However, they are also different between groups of one and the same country (cf. Alatas et al. 2009b). 
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externalities as a consequence of corruption become persistent and may inhibit social 
development. Then, only a ‘big-push’ in the form of an exogenous shock may bring a society 
out of such a corruption trap (e.g., Collier 2000). 
The present experimental literature does not address these problems on the emergence 
and persistence of pro- or anti-corrupt behaviour sufficiently. Particularly, we suggest testing 
in repeated games for variables which have an influence on the formation of such behaviour 
in groups. The only recent exception in this direction is Schikora (2010, 36-76). A closely 
related topic is the investigation of network formation. Particularly, those factors that lead to 
the establishing of networks with negative network externalities have not been investigated by 
experimental research in detail. However, it is known from many contexts that networks 
exhibit negative externalities for third parties as well as for some network members.
6
 The 
appearance of negative network externalities can be set within the context with topics related 
to corruption. Thus, economists and other social scientists should pose the question which 
factors mitigate and constrain negative externalities of networks, and thus avoid the 
emergence of ‘cultures of crime’ or ‘corruption traps’. Such a focus on endogenous variables 
may go hand in hand with the already identified exogenous variables that seem to influence 
corrupt behaviour in one way or another. 
(3) Integrating Research Methods: Now we turn to the final aspect, i.e. applying 
research methods from different disciplines as complementary tools to economic experiments. 
Abbink (2006, 436) also emphasizes an aspect of this issue when he calls for “stronger links 
between field and laboratory research”. However, we go one step further and would not 
include only experiments but also methods in the neighbouring fields. We have already 
emphasized the importance of considering individual perceptions of norms and within-group 
dynamics in experiments. Here it could be fruitful for economists to employ insights applied 
in other sciences. This does not only refer to methodological issues but also to available 
results derived through other methods. The sheer acceptance of results derived solely by 
incentive compatibility methods may restrict potential insights and be an obstacle in the 
specific context of corruption. Particularly, if the aim of corruption experiments is to derive 
insights on mechanisms which can be used for developing policy measures, then a 
combination of experiments with other methods seems to be reasonable. The investigation of 
corruption has produced abundant literature in disciplines such as Anthropology, 
                                                          
6
 Gatti et al. (2003, 5-6) mentions a number of empirical studies on corruption and networks. 
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Criminology, Development Theory, Organizational Studies, Political Science, Psychology, 
and Sociology. Thus, a large methodological toolbox is at hand: surveys, in-depth interviews, 
participant observation and case studies are well established methods in other social sciences. 
Findings obtained by these methods can be used as complements to economic experiments, as 
they might allow for synergetic effects. A general rejection of non-incentive compatibility 
methods limits the possible insights. Especially where an incentive compatible design is 
impossible – where participants are asked to reveal their values or other information they 
might not be aware of – Economics can gain from e.g. in-depth interviews. After all, 
economists collect personal data after most of the economic experiments, without this post-
experimental questionnaire being incentive-compatible.  
This paper has striven to provide a survey of the fast growing literature on 
experimental economics on corruption and corrupt behaviour. The topic has only recently 
gained attention by experimental economists. We have outlined some issues which we 
consider important after having reviewed the literature. We expect a severe impact of 
experimental research not only on understanding the fundamental causes of corruption but 
also on developing tools to fight against it and thus to promote growth and social well-being. 
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